Abstract. We conducted six treatments of a standard moral hazard experiment with hidden action. The behavior in all treatments and periods was inconsistent with established agency theory. In the early periods, behavior differed significantly between treatments. This difference largely vanished in the final periods. We used logit agent quantal response equilibrium (LAQRE) as a device to grasp boundedly rational behavior and found the following: (1) LAQRE predictions are much closer to subjects' behavior in the laboratory; (2) LAQRE probabilities and experimental behavior show remarkably similar patterns; and (3) including social preferences in LAQRE does not better explain the experimental data; (4) LAQRE cannot explain the contract offers of some players who seem to choose some focal contract parameters.
INTRODUCTION
Moral hazard with hidden action in principal-agent-relationships is an established theory of behavior under asymmetric information and has found entrance into most modern microeconomic textbooks. In several prior experimental studies of different versions and framings of the moral hazard problem the authors find evidence of social preferences. First, we want to explore the robustness of these findings concerning social preferences in a moral hazard game. To do this, we vary the standard experimental setting of this problem and design additional treatments which are meant to induce a behavior closer to the subgame-perfect Nash solution than in the standard experimental setting. In addition, in contrast to most of the experimental studies on the moral hazard problem, in our moral hazard game the principal has to choose two contract parameters. However, if social preferences were decisive, the principal should deviate from the standard game theoretic solution by changing only one of these parameters. Therefore, the behavior of the principals in our experimental setting provides a more precise feedback regarding the importance of social preferences. If deviations from the game theoretic solution cannot be explained by social preferences alone, which will be the case for our data, the boundedness of rationality may play an important role. Therefore, second, we aim to test the usefulness to explicitly take bounded rationality into account.
We have conducted six different treatments which differ with respect to the framing of the experimental game and with respect to the assignment of the roles. We find three major results: (1) the behavior in our six treatments converges so that treatment effects have largely vanished in the final period of play.
(2) Social preferences can hardly explain the observed behavior. (3) The subgame-perfect Nash equilibria are not played even once in 708 cases. (4) Compared to rational behavior with or without social preferences, the logit agent quantal response equilibrium LAQRE (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998 ) not only provides better predictions of the statistical means of experimental behavior but also provides a rough approximation of the distribution of contract choices.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the moral hazard problem with hidden action and reports experimental results in the related literature. Section 3 introduces our experimental design and provides hypotheses. Section 4 presents our experimental results. Section 5 reconstructs the experimental data using the concept of LAQRE equilibria, in Section 6 we discuss social preferences, and Section 7 concludes.
MORAL HAZARD WITH HIDDEN ACTION AS AN ESTABLISHED THEORY IN MICROECONOMICS AND RELATED LITERATURE
Agency problems have been analyzed theoretically in the last three decades under a variety of conditions, beginning with the studies of Ross (1973) , Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979) . Standard theory postulates that the principal and the agent individually behave rationally, i.e. they have self-centered preferences and maximize expected utility. In the case of hidden action, after signing a contract, the agent takes an action or chooses an effort on behalf of the principal. The effort cannot be observed by the principal. A higher effort of the agent is associated with a higher expected outcome that accrues to the principal and results in higher effort costs for the agent. Since the outcome is exposed to risk, the principal cannot deduce the agent's effort ex post. Therefore, the asymmetric information with regard to the agent's effort induces the well-known moral hazard problem. The agent can choose an inefficiently low level of effort that the principal is unable to detect. Another version of the moral hazard problem arises when the agent's effort is not verifiable by a third party responsible for the enforcement of the contract between principal and agent. Again, the principal cannot force the agent to choose the efficient level of effort. The source of the moral hazard problem is not the stochastic outcome; rather, it is the non-enforceability of contractual agreements based on effort choice. In our experiment we assume non-stochastic outcome and analyze the second version, i.e. the moral hazard problem with non-verifiable action.
To mitigate or even prevent the moral hazard problem, the principal can offer a payment scheme to the agent in which payments depend on outcomes. The basic agency problem consists of determining the optimal payment scheme to maximize the principal's (expected) utility under two constraints. First, the incentive compatibility constraint is necessary since it is assumed that the agent chooses the effort level that maximizes his (expected) utility. Second, the participation constraint ensures that the agent obtains a sufficiently high payment to M. Erlei and H. Schenk-Mathes accept the offer. Recently, Chen and Zhao (2013) have introduced unawareness in the agent's behavior. Yet, in contrast to our paper Chen and Zhao cancel the assumption of common knowledge.
In the early 1990s, experiments testing the principal-agent model with hidden action 1 were conducted by Berg et al. (1992) and Epstein (1992) , and the findings were in line with standard theory. However, their experimental design only allowed for two possible actions, and the set of feasible contracts that they used was extremely small. Later experimental results show that individuals often deviate from the predictions of standard principal-agent theory (Anderhub et al., 2002; Cochard and Willinger, 2005; Fehr and G€ achter, 2001; Fehr et al., 2004; G€ uth et al., 1998 , 2001 Willinger, 2000, 2007) . In these experiments, there are three principal findings concerning the subjects' behavior. First, the principals' contract offers are far more generous than those predicted by standard theory. Second, the agents' acceptance decisions deviate from individually rational behavior; i.e. they reject contract offers even if the offers fulfill the participation constraint. Third, the agents' effort choices are often best responses. In case of deviations, behavior can be explained by fairness norms or reciprocity.
In summary, actual behavior in experiments is sometimes better explained by fairness norms and reciprocity than by standard theory. However, these findings have several shortcomings. Similar to the experiments conducted in the early 1990s, the agents in the more recent studies often only have two possible actions (e.g. Chernomaz, 2011; Cochard and Willinger, 2005; Willinger, 2000, 2007) . Other studies are restricted to incentive contracts consisting of the payment of a fixed wage and a fine that the agent has to pay in case of shirking. Typically, shirking cannot be verified with certainty (e.g. Fehr and G€ achter, 2001; Fehr et al., 2004) .
2 Our experiment is most similar to the studies of Anderhub et al. (2002) and G€ uth et al. (2001) which allow payment schemes with the two contract parameters fixed wage and revenue share. In these studies as in the other studies mentioned above, rational behavior is assumed, and deviations from standard theory are explained by introducing social preferences. Our objective is to test the robustness of social preferences and to determine whether bounded rationality provides a better explanation of the experimental data.
SIX EXPERIMENTAL VARIATIONS OF THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM WITH NON-VERIFIABLE ACTION

Experimental design
We conducted six treatments. In each treatment we considered the following principal-agent setting:
At stage 1, the principal offers a contract including a fixed wage (wage) and a revenue share (share) in percent. The revenue (r) depends on the agent's effort (e) and is given by r(e) = 35Áe. For the wage and the share, the following restrictions must hold:
wage 2 fÀ700; À699; . . .; 699; 700g share 2 f0; 1; . . .; 99; 100g:
At stage 2, the agent can accept or reject the offer. If the agent rejects the offer, both the principal and the agent earn a payoff of zero. Agents that accept the offer enter stage 3 and choose a work effort e 2 {0, 1, . . ., 50} that induces private costs of c(e) = 7/8Áe². Therefore, the payoffs of the principal, p P , and the agent, p A , are given by
Each of the six treatments comprised six periods. The participants were divided into groups of two members. One member took the role of the principal, and the other took the role of the agent. The six treatments differed in the assignment of the roles. In two of the six treatments, the roles were randomly assigned, which constitutes the standard experimental setting. In two other treatments, we combined the principal-agent setting with an auction to assign the role of the principal to the member giving the highest bid. In the remaining two treatments, we utilized a real effort play to determine the principal of the group. The real effort play will be explained in detail below.
The treatments with non-random assignment of roles were introduced to induce a behavior that is significantly closer to the standard subgame-perfect solution than in other experiments. The basic idea was that the need to earn the assignment to the favorable role (the position of the principal) may lead all subjects to regard this position's benefits as an entitlement to its holder so that unequal transaction payoffs may not be regarded as unfair (e.g. G€ uth and Tietz, 1986; Spitzer, 1982, 1985; Erlei and Siemer, 2014) . In the instructions, we try to draw the attention of the reader to the fact that the position of the principal is the more favorable. In three of the four treatments with non-random assignment of roles, we even informed the participants about the maximum revenue for the principal in standard theory. Paying for becoming the principal in the auction treatments or waiving the generation of individual payoffs with the aim of winning the role of the principal in the real effort treatments may reduce the importance of social preferences.
At the beginning of a session of the Baseline treatment, the groups were randomly composed, and the roles were randomly assigned. In each period, the three stages of the principal-agent setting were played. The randomly composed groups and the randomly assigned roles remained the same during each session of the treatment.
The Baseline One Shot treatment was identical to the Baseline treatment, except that the groups were dissolved and randomly recomposed after each period so that reputation effects can largely be ruled out. Compared to the Baseline treatment, fairness-oriented behavior seems to be less likely.
At the beginning of a session of the One Auction treatment, the groups were composed and the participants received an initial endowment. Then, the two members of each group played a second price-sealed bid auction. The member with the highest bid was given the role of the principal during the following six periods of the session and paid a price amounting to the losing bid of the competing group member, who became the agent. In case that the bids in a group were the same, the member who took the most time for bidding was given the role of the agent. The groups remained the same, and there was no role switch during a session.
At the beginning of each period in the Repeated Auctions treatment, the groups were randomly composed, and roles were assigned by an ascending bid auction. In each period, the participants received an additional endowment for the auction.
Because the auction winner has to pay for becoming the principal, we presumed that the behavior in the two auction treatments will be significantly closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium than in the Baseline treatments.
At the beginning of each period of the Real Effort treatment, the groups were randomly composed and the subjects had to perform two tasks that represented graphical optimization problems (see e.g. van Dijk et al., 2001) . They had to find by trial and error the highest value of a function with two variables. Starting at the origin, the subjects could increase or decrease the value of the variables in discrete steps of 1. After each move, the value of the function was indicated, and the subjects had to wait three-seconds for the next move. The time lag was introduced to ensure that no advantage was provided to experienced players of computer games. In every period the search lasted 60 seconds. The subjects worked on two tasks of the same type, A and B, but the parameters of the function differed: the optimal values of the variables leading to the maximum of the function were not the same in the two tasks (and also changed from period to period). The subjects began work on Task A and then could switch tasks whenever they wanted. Task B was rewarded with a direct payment determined by the success of the search process. Based on the result of Task A, the 20 subjects of a session were ranked in each period. Then, groups of two members were composed according to the following rule: The subject ranked number i, i 2 {1, 2, . . ., 10}, and the subject ranked number i + 10 formed a group. Finally, in each group, the subject with the higher score for Task A was given the role of the principal. The other subject took the role of the agent for this period. The subjects could work on Task B to directly achieve a higher payment, or they could spend time on Task A to increase the probability of becoming a principal. Since the equilibrium payoffs of the principal are higher than the agents' payoffs, becoming a principal was valuable. In this treatment, the principal was named the employer and the agent was named the employee.
Again, we expected that adding a real effort play to the standard experimental setting would reduce the impact of social preferences.
Finally, in the Real Effort No Framing treatment, the terms 'employer' and 'employee' were substituted with the neutral terms 'participant X' and 'participant Y'. This was the only difference between the two Real Effort treatments. Figure 1 shows a summary of the experimental design. Table 1 indicates characteristics of the six treatments.
All six treatments contain an identical Principal-Agent game which is significantly varied by role assignment and the framing of the game. It is our objective to analyze whether subjects' behavior in these variations of the game is robust or not.
Game theoretic solution and discussion
Regardless of the treatment, the game theoretic solution of the moral hazard problem is the following: Assuming continuity and based on the contract offer of the principal, the agent i maximizes his payoff by choosing the effort e opt i ¼ share i
5 . This is the best response effort. Due to the discrete choice set there are multiple subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. The corresponding wage-share combinations are (À350, 100), (À343, 99), (À336, 98), (À349, 100), (À342, 99) and (À335, 98). In the first three cases the agent accepts contract offers in case of indifference, whereas in the final three cases agents reject such offers.
We do not consider refinements of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Note that in the Baseline Treatment and in the One Auction Treatment, because of the partner matching, it is possible to apply the reputation equilibrium concept with imperfect information.
Note that introducing social preferences like inequity aversion or social welfare preferences (SWP) does only influence the choice of the fixed wage. Shares below 98% lead to inefficient effort decisions of the agent and lower payoffs for both, the principal and the agent.
Our experimental design is closely related to that of Anderhub et al. (2002) and G€ uth et al. (2001) . The game of Anderhub et al. (2002) has multiple equilibria with shares between 500/7 and 100% resulting from a piecewise linear cost function. Anderhub et al. (2002) observe that surplus sharing is less asymmetric and therefore less unfair than predicted by game theory. In addition, the optimal effort constitutes a corner solution. We enlarged the set of feasible efforts to obtain an interior optimal solution and introduced a strictly convex cost function. Compared with G€ uth et al. (2001) , our sets of feasible contracts and feasible efforts are larger, but they remain discrete choice sets. In contrast to our study, G€ uth et al. (2001) analyze agency relationships with one principal and two agents. Their focus is not only on vertical but also on horizontal fairness. However, G€ uth et al. (2001) observe revenue shares which are too low compared with the game theoretic solution. This observation cannot be explained with social preferences alone.
As in Anderhub et al. (2002) and G€ uth et al. (2001) , and in contrast to the other studies mentioned above, we consider a non-stochastic outcome. For the Nash equilibria in our experiment risk preferences are therefore irrelevant. Yet this is not true for the LAQRE equilibrium with probabilistic choices. In the following we assume risk neutrality.
Experimental procedures
The experiment consisted of 12 sessions, 2 for each treatment. In all treatments but one, 40 subjects participated. The Baseline One Shot treatment was the exception with only 36 subjects. Each subject participated in only one session. The subjects were separated from each other by blinders, and they remained anonymous.
Bounded Rationality
The experiment was computerized and conducted with the help of the z-Tree experimental software developed by Fischbacher (2007) . At the beginning of a session, the instructions appeared on a computer screen and were simultaneously read aloud by the experimenter. The instructions include a table with possible efforts and the corresponding revenue and costs for the agent. The participants had to answer a set of control questions. Furthermore, before the six payoff periods started, the subjects completed two training periods to become familiar with the rules of the experiment. For the statistical analyses, if we use the data of the six payoff periods of each subject, we assume that data in the different periods are independent.
The sessions lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours. The payment was 24.66 €, on average.
Hypotheses
Our starting point is behavior according to standard theory. Therefore, we have to compare our data with the behavior in subgame-perfect Nash equilibria:
Hypothesis 1: (subgame perfect Nash equilibria) (a)Agents choose best response efforts. (b)Agents accept a contract if and only if it offers a non-negative payoff. (c)Principals choose share = 100 and wage 2 {À350, À349} or share = 99 and wage 2 {À343, À342} or share = 98 and wage 2 {À336, À335}.
However, if deviations from the game theoretic solution occur and cannot be explained with social preferences alone, the boundedness of rationality may play a role. This leads to our Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: (bounded rationality) LAQRE reconstructs the basic patterns of behavior better than subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
We are aware that completely rational behavior is a special case of the LAQRE. More precisely, in this special case LAQRE converges to a mixed strategy profile in which only the pure equilibrium strategies of the equilibria given in Hypothesis 1 have strictly positive probabilities. We expect systematic deviations from rational behavior and a corresponding pattern of contract offers according to LAQRE.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide an overview of the main characteristics of behavior in our six treatments. Working backwards through the game tree of our experiment, we start with the agents' effort decisions (Section 4.1), and we continue with their acceptance decisions (Section 4.2) and the principals' contract offers (Section 4.3).
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Effort
Effort choices according to rational behavior within the different subgames vary with the underlying contracts. Sequentially rational behavior demands effort to be chosen according to e Figure 2 clearly shows a convergence toward rational effort choices. In period 2, the median effort deviation is very close to zero. In period 6, it is exactly zero in all treatments. Furthermore, the dispersion of the effort deviation in the final period is very small. In the Baseline treatment, the remaining box representing the interquartile range is hardly visible at all, which means that almost all choices in Period 6 correspond to the individually optimal efforts. Table A1 given in the Appendix A shows the means and medians for all treatments and all periods. This table strongly confirms our interpretation of Figure 2 . In particular, all medians in period 6 equal zero, and the means fluctuate closely around zero (Hypothesis 1a). This is confirmed by t-tests: Using session means of period 6 as independent observations, we cannot reject the Null hypothesis that the mean of effort deviations equals zero (p = 0.5649, n = 12). This contrasts behavior in period 1 in which the same Null hypothesis can be rejected (p = 0.0000, n = 12). Wilcoxon signed ranks tests show the same results: In period 1 (period 6) the Null hypothesis that the median effort deviation is zero can be rejected (cannot be rejected). The corresponding p values are 0.0022 (0.9375).
Assuming independent subject choices we also cannot reject the null hypothesis that the mean of effort deviations in period 6 equals zero (p = 0.5044, n = 97). The same confirmation can be obtained by a Wilcoxon signed ranks test. Therefore, we can state our first result, which is in line with results from previous experiments.
Result 1: Effort decisions are close to the corresponding profit maximizing values. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a is supported by the data.
Contract acceptance behavior
According to the game theoretical predictions, agents will accept all contract offers that enable them to realize nonnegative profits. This condition is fulfilled whenever contract terms are such that wage i ! À 7 200 share 2 i . To summarize the acceptance behavior, we define classes of contract offers with respect to (fixed) wage intervals and (return) share intervals. In total, 708 contract offers are classified. Table 2 shows the fraction of accepted offers in 84 classes.
In the shaded area, one can find the fractions of accepted contract offers for which theory expects agents to reject (Hypothesis 1b). Following standard theory, the fractions of accepted offers in this area should always be zero because even with the best response effort the expected profit of the agent is negative (in total 67 cases). In contrast, in the non-shaded area the contract offers always lead to non-negative profits (in total 641 cases). In particular, whenever wages are larger than zero, standard theory predicts that offers will always be accepted.
Theory is somewhat confirmed by the data, because most numbers in the shaded area are close to zero, whereas numbers in the non-shaded area are close to 1. In the non-shaded area, 75 of the 641 contract offers are 'wrong rejections' for rational decision makers because these offers lead to positive profits for the agents. The 'wrong acceptances', i.e. those cells in the shaded area with a fraction strictly greater than zero, add up to only 13 of 67 cases. None of these cases occurs in period 6. Our interpretation is therefore that the incorrect acceptances may be part of the participants' learning processes.
We also analyze the acceptance behavior for the treatments. Table 3 shows that wrong rejections are always below 20%. The interpretation of the wrong acceptances for each treatment is not possible due to too small sample sizes. (2) (6) (1)
Note: Numbers for share intervals are percentages. Fractions of accepted contract offers for which theory expects agents to reject are shown in the shaded area.
Result 2: The behavior with respect to accepting or declining contract offers is often consistent with equilibrium predictions. In total, the fractions of wrong acceptances and wrong rejections are 11.7% and 19.4%, respectively. Thus, Hypothesis 1b is (weakly) supported by our data.
Note that, in contrast to wrong rejections, wrong acceptances can hardly be explained by social preferences.
Contract offers
The experimental game considered in this paper has multiple subgame-perfect Nash Equilibria with rather similar contract offers. According to standard theory (Hypothesis 1c), the share should correspond to at least 98% and together with the fixed wage should leave the agent with a payoff of 0 or 1. However, in 708 cases, these equilibrium contract offers have not been proposed even once. Table 4 shows the distribution of the contract offers. 3 This distribution may be characterized by three properties:
1 There are two local peaks. One peak is characterized by shares between 90% and 100% and fixed wages between À249 and À150. The other peak corresponds to less asymmetric payoff distributions with shares between 41% and 60% and wages between À49 and +50. 2 In each column of Table 4 , we underline the two cells with the highest frequencies. Combining them leads to a downward-sloping area within the table that starts with wages between 1 and 100 in the second column and ends with wages between À249 and À150. The peaks of the contract distribution lie within this range. 3 Relative frequencies outside the high-frequency range are often close to zero. this  table  we  have  grouped  contract  types  into  28 wage categories (À700 þ ðn À 1Þ Á 50\wage À 700 þ n Á 50; n 2 f1; 2; . . .28g) and 10 share categories (ðn À 1Þ Á 10\ share 10 Á n; n 2 f1; 2; . . .; 10g). The first categories (n = 1) for wages and shares also include wage = À700 and share = 0, respectively. Thus we had 280 contract categories in total.
Such a distribution of contract offers cannot be explained by conventional subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium because the equilibrium contract offers have not been chosen at all.
Result 3: The distribution of contract offers is inconsistent with the subgameperfect Nash equilibrium of the underlying principal-agent model. Consequently, Hypothesis 1c is rejected by our data.
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4 With respect to the offered shares the Kruskal-Wallis test finds no significant differences between the treatments. Taking session means as independent observations, we find no significant treatment differences in fixed wages and offered shares.
It is an open question whether behavior in treatments is similar over all periods. Another open question is whether contract offers finally converge. Therefore, we also present summary statistics of contract offers in the final period (Table 6 ).
In period 6, the mean wages are negative in all treatments. Moreover, the mean shares of Real Effort and Real Effort No Framing have increased substantially and can hardly be distinguished from the first three treatments. The mean share only remains well below 50 in the Repeated Auctions treatment. Our interpretation of these data is that the participants underwent a learning process that induced a convergence of behavior. However, in the Repeated Auctions treatment, this learning process seems to have been slower than in the other treatments. In spite of this, Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-population tests cannot reject the null hypotheses that offered wages (p = 0.3027, n = 118) and 4. As will be seen later, the Repeated Auctions treatment diverges somewhat from the other treatments, which is why we test for all treatments except Repeated Auctions.
shares (p = 0.2218, n = 118) of the different treatments in period 6 originate from the same distribution. Taking session means as independent observations we also find no significant treatment differences in fixed wages and offered shares.
Result 4:
We find large and significant treatment effects in early periods and little evidence for treatment effects in the final period.
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The distribution of contract terms is thus very similar to the distribution for all periods, with the exception that there seems to be much less noise.
Result 5: There is no convergence toward the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
In summary, we find a fairly stable pattern of contract offers that is clearly inconsistent with the equilibrium prediction. The differences between treatments prove to be unstable. We interpret the treatment effects as phenomena of bounded rationality and learning that diminish with players' experience. Consequently, we have not provided an explanation for subjects' behavior in our experiment yet. In the following section, we try to provide such an explanation by referring to an equilibrium concept that explicitly accounts for bounded rationality (Hypothesis 2) and that may be interpreted as the endpoint of a learning process, i.e. the LAQRE equilibrium.
EXPLAINING PARTICIPANTS' BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL BEHAVIOR WITH LAQRE EQUILIBRIA
LAQRE equilibrium as a device for grasping bounded rationality
In Nash equilibria, players perfectly optimize their strategy choice given the strategies of all other players. They never choose suboptimal strategies, and they never make mistakes. LAQRE equilibrium is a game theoretic equilibrium concept that takes erroneous behavior into account. Logit quantal response equilibrium (LQRE) is a particular case of quantal response equilibria, a concept developed by Palfrey (1995, 1998) . The essence of the LQRE equilibrium is to transfer the idea of probabilistic choice (Luce, 1959) into the spheres of game theory.
Let Ep ik denote the expected payoff (or expected utility) of player i choosing strategy k, k 2 {1, 2, . . ., K}, then player i's probability of choosing k is given by
Here, l denotes the error parameter. If l converges to infinity, the player behaves completely unintelligently and chooses a strategy according to a uniform distribution. In case of l ? 0, the player is perfectly rational. For intermediate values, each strategy is chosen with strictly positive probability, and strategies providing higher expected profits are chosen with higher probabilities. As usual in QRE applications, we assume that all subjects have the same error parameter l. Assuming individual error parameters (as briefly discussed but not executed in Anderson et al., 1998a, p. 310) would, of course, induce a closer fit to the data. Yet this may rightly be regarded as an overfitting because this would mean the introduction of 236 additional parameters for explaining 708 periods of play.
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In economic games, a strategy's expected payoff is usually also dependent on the other players' strategies, i.e., Ep ik ¼ P (s Ài ) denoting the player i's expected probability that the other players choose this particular strategy profile. The LQRE equilibrium is then defined by two requirements. (1) The probability of each player i choosing his strategy k is given by (1) for all players and all strategies, and (2) all players' beliefs about the distribution of the other players' strategy combinations are correct, i.e. pr e s Ài ð Þ ¼ pr s Ài ð Þ. The second requirement is often called the 'consistency requirement' (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, p. 29) . It restricts agents' beliefs to be consistent with players' actions. Without such a constraint one could use arbitrary beliefs of the other players' behavior. Allowing for arbitrary beliefs, however, deprives the equilibrium concept of much of its empirical content: many probability distributions of strategies would become consistent with an equilibrium. In addition, note that this consistency requirement should not be interpreted as rational expectations or perfect foresight. Agents' errors all stem from their perception of profits which are the true profits plus one random term l Á e ik assuming that the values of e ik are i.i.d and that they have an extreme value probability density function.
For each value of the error parameter l there is at least one specific LQRE equilibrium. In most applications, the error parameter is estimated with maximum likelihood techniques. Note that in case of l ? 0, the LQRE equilibrium coincides with a specific Nash equilibrium. McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) extend the concept of quantal response equilibrium in general and the concept of LQRE equilibrium in particular to extensive form games. The corresponding logit agent quantal response equilibrium (LAQRE) then corresponds to the LQRE equilibrium of the agent normal form of the underlying extensive form game. In case of l ? 0 the LAQRE equilibrium converges to a sequential equilibrium. In games of perfect information (like ours) there is a unique LAQRE for each value of l (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998, p. 16).
Before applying the equilibrium concept to our own experiment, it is worth mentioning that numerous successful applications of LQRE and LAQRE equilibrium to specific contexts exist (Anderson et al., 1998b (Anderson et al., , 2001 (Anderson et al., , 2002 (Anderson et al., , 2004 Capra et al., 1999; Holt, 2000, 2001; Goeree et al., 2002) . In fact, quantal response equilibrium has been so successful that Camerer et al. (2004) suggest that 'Quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a statistical generalization of Nash, almost always explains the direction of deviations from Nash and should replace Nash as the static benchmark to which other models are routinely compared'.
LAQRE equilibrium of our experimental games
As previously mentioned, the LAQRE of our experimental game varies with the error parameter l. For example if l converges to zero, the distribution of contract offers will converge to a mixed strategy with a probability of 1/3 for each of the following contract offers: (À335, 98), (À342, 99) or (À349, 100). In contrast, if l approaches infinity, all possible contract offers will be chosen with the same probability. Our main task, therefore, is to estimate l. We conducted a standard maximum likelihood estimation with 118 cases for contract offers, 118 decisions whether to accept the offer, and 97 effort choices in period 6. According to our estimation, the magnitude of the error parameter is l = 52.56 with a standard error of 2.30. This value of l is significantly greater than zero (p < 0.001).
5 Consequently, we reject the hypothesis of perfectly rational behavior. Table 8 shows the LAQRE distribution with this error parameter.
Comparing Table 8 with Table 7 , we find that the distribution of contract offers according to LAQRE has a peak at wages between À150 and À200 with shares between 91% and 100%. We also find a similar high-frequency range of contract offers. Most probabilities outside this range are close to zero. The peaks within most columns are identical in both tables. Yet, the absolute values of the 5. The log-likelihood value of our estimation is À1597.50.
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probabilities differ to some degree. Nevertheless, LAQRE explains the distribution of contract offers far better than standard Nash equilibrium. This finding can also be illustrated by some summary statistics given in Table 9 . The expected value of fixed wages and the expected value of revenue shares in the LAQRE are much closer to the data means than the corresponding values in the Nash equilibria. Although LAQRE performs better than Nash equilibrium, there are still two major shortcomings. First, we cannot reconstruct the second peak in the distribution of empirical contract offers. This second peak located around a wage of zero and a share of 50% is simply absent in our LAQRE. 6 We conjecture that the second peak may best be explained as a focal point. A fixed wage of zero and a share of 50% are both medial values within the range of feasible values. Furthermore, this contract offer leads to the same revenue for principal and agent. This symmetry and equal distribution of revenue may be attractive for human decision makers. Two other contracts lying close to the medial contract are <wage = 43.75; share = 50> and <wage = 0; share = 66.67>, this leads to another symmetry or fairness argument. Both offers induce a symmetric distribution of profits if the agent chooses individually optimal levels of effort. Note that these wage-share combinations are never part of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) because these equilibria consist of contracts with shares close to 100% and wages that accomplish an equal distribution of profits.
Second, the mean of the fixed wages in period 6 is still substantially greater than the expected value of wages in the LAQRE. We suppose that this is largely due to a combination of subjects' dislike of offering negative wages and a rather slow learning process. Table 10 shows the empirical means of wages over periods. The wages are obviously decreasing and they may not have reached their final values in the final periods of our sessions.
We can also reconstruct some aspects of the participants' learning processes. Since we assume that the parameter l represents the limitation of players' rationality, a learning process should be characterized by decreasing values of l over the periods. Table 11 shows estimates of the l-values over periods and treatments.
Although the development of l is not monotonous in any treatment there seems to be a clearly decreasing trend of l in all treatments. Furthermore, the differences in the l-values between treatments decreases as well. In period 1 the difference between the highest and the lowest value of l is 195.04 and the highest value of l is about three times as large as the smallest value. In period 6 this The predicted probabilities of acceptances according to the LAQRE are also largely consistent with the empirical data. Table 12 shows the LAQRE probabilities of accepting contract offers for selected contracts.
Because the empirical probabilities of contract acceptances given in Table 2 are calculated for only few cases in many of the cells, it is quite difficult to compare Table 12 with the empirical distribution. However, the framed cells in Table 12 correspond to cells in Table 2 In LAQRE effort choices are only dependent on the agent's revenue share. Column 3 of Table 13 shows mean effort choices in the LAQRE for selected revenue shares. 7. We also conducted Maximum likelihood estimations for the share (n = 708) and the fixed wage (n = 708) with the independent variable 1/period and found out that shares and wages converge toward 57.87 (shares) and À45.17 (wages).
The difference between mean effort choices according to LAQRE and subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) is given in column 4. One can see that these deviations decrease with increasing revenue shares. Column 6 shows that this, by and large, is also true for the empirical deviations of effort choices from SPNE. Only for high revenue shares (≥60) for which the differences between the predicted efforts are very small (≤0.16) SPNE is slightly closer to the empirical mean than LAQRE. Following Hoppe and Schmitz (2013) and Rogers et al. (2009) , we provide two benchmarks for the quality of the overall fit (Table 14) . These are the log likelihoods of two scenarios: The first is a worst case scenario in which players choose all feasible actions of their corresponding information sets with equal probability. In terms of the LAQRE this is equivalent to the behavior according to a l equal to infinity. In contrast, the best case scenario comprises of a LAQRE with choice probabilities identical to the empirical values.
A likelihood ratio test comparing the LAQRE estimation with the worst case as a restricted model of our estimation (k = l À1 = 0) confirms that LAQRE fits significantly better than the worst case model (LR = 530.34, p = 0.0000).
Summarizing the characteristics of the LAQRE we can state our final major result:
Result 6: In our experiment LAQRE reconstructs the basic patterns of behavior much better than subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is supported by our data.
Logit agent quantal response equilibrium also has interesting implications for normative agency theory. Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium contracts are anything but optimal.
8 According to the logic of LAQRE, a contract offer of <wage = À350; share = 100> will be rejected with a probability of 62.2%, and the principal's expected profit is thereby reduced to 132.19. Even the focal contract <wage = 0; share = 50> is superior to this Nash contract. As the focal contract will be accepted with a probability of 77.3%, its expected profits according to LAQRE amount to 140.18. However, the contract maximizing the principal's profit comprises a fixed wage of À253 and a share of 100%. In this case, the contract will be accepted with a probability of 79.4%, and the expected principal's profits equal 200.76. LAQRE retains the insight that a large share of 100 is efficient. However, it also shows that it is important that the agent has a sufficiently high incentive for accepting the offer. The commonly used participation constraint, which states that it is sufficient for the principal to cover the agent's monetary opportunity cost, simply does not work for laboratory behavior. Increasing the agent's fixed wage, however, generates a real incentive for the agent to enter the contractual relationship.
SOCIAL PREFERENCES
Both the empirical distribution of contract offers and the agents' acceptance behavior show that the distribution of surplus is important for understanding subjects' behavior. It therefore seems likely that social preferences might be involved. Inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 8 . In a different experiment and with a different methodological approach, K€ onigstein (2001) also finds that subgame-perfect equilibrium contracts do not maximize the principal's profits.
1999
) and SWP (Charness and Rabin, 2002) are the most prominent approaches for this kind of reasoning. However, a mere change of the utility function -leaving the concept of Nash equilibrium uncontested -cannot explain the above pattern of contract distributions. Inequity aversion and SWP both leave no room for contracts with shares below 98%, as we assumed a non-stochastic outcome.
In inequity aversion models, any fairness aspect can be resolved by paying higher fixed wages. Any decrease in the agent's share creates an inefficiency that reduces both participants' utilities. The same argument holds for SWP. Correspondingly, the high-frequency range of contracts with shares below 98% cannot be explained.
It is still possible, however, to combine the concept of LAQRE with social preferences. We calculated several other LAQRE for different utility functions that account for such preferences, 9 and the high-frequency range of contract offers remains close to the basic LAQRE without social preferences. One important difference occurred, however: The high-frequency range is shifted upward toward the contract <wage = À175; share = 100>. Table 15 provides an overview of our results.
The SP model consists of the LAQRE of purely selfish players as we modeled them above. The log likelihood of this model is larger than its value from Section 5 because of the categorization of contracts. The IA model describes the LAQRE for inequity averse players with a utility function . 10 In the SP/IA model we follow Fehr et al. (2007) in assuming that 60% of the players are purely selfish and 40% of the players are inequity averse. In the last model we assume the existence of a third type of players. Players with social welfare preferences (SWP) have a utility function U i = p i + 0.5 Á (p i + p j ). Following Erlei (2008) , we assume that the weight of social welfare in the utility function is 0.5 and that 50% of all players are purely selfish, 35% have SWP preferences, and 15% of the players are inequity averse. Table 15 shows that the IA model clearly provides a worse explanation of laboratory behavior than our standard SP model: the log likelihood value is much smaller. The other two models, SP/IA and SP/IA/SWP, have a likelihood close to but nevertheless below the one in the SP model. Thus the inclusion of different variations of social preferences does not improve the reconstruction of subjects' behavior. 9. For these estimations, we grouped the contract types as in Table 4 or Table 7 considering again 280 contract categories in total. 10. The parameter values are taken from Fehr et al. (2007) .
Finally, we discuss the usefulness of applying stage-specific error parameters in the LAQRE model. Up to now, it is common practice to estimate one error parameter for each game. This parameter is meant to describe the subjects' degree of rationality, which varies with each game. This is sensible because different games are differently complicated such that each game needs its own error parameter (Anderson et al., 2002, p. 41) . However, it is also true that different stages within a game may be differently complicated so that each decision stage may require a specific error parameter to account for the different characteristics of the corresponding decision problem (cf. Goeree et al., 2005, p. 363) .
To see whether this has an impact on our results, we estimated an error parameter for each stage using the data of period 6. We started with the error parameter in stage 3 and used the estimated value to calculate the expected profits in earlier periods. We then estimated the error parameter of stage 2 and used this value for our final estimation of the error parameter of stage 1. This backward estimation procedure provides the error parameters l 1 = 65.35, l 2 = 39.43 and l 3 = 40.58. The magnitudes of the parameters are plausible because the decisions in stages 2 and 3 are clearly less difficult than the choice of a contract offer in stage 1. The log-likelihood values also improved. However, the theoretical LAQRE distribution of contract offers changed only marginally. Correspondingly, we confined ourselves to a single error parameter for the experimental game.
CONCLUSION
Our experimental data indicate that a learning process occurs and that subjects behavior in the different treatments converges. Accordingly, after some learning has taken place behavior seems to be rather robust across treatments. The principals' contract offers in the final period are similar to the predictions made according to logit agent quantal response equilibrium. The only major deviation consists of a focal point with contract parameters in the middle of the range of the possible parameters. In contrast, the contract offer in subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is not chosen even once in 708 cases. Inequity aversion or SWP may play a role but do not explain the contract distribution in our experiment if combined with the assumption of rational behavior. In particular, contracts with shares less than 98% cannot be explained with utility functions including social preferences as long as the Nash equilibrium concept is applied. Our focal point also corresponds to an equal distribution of revenues or profits. However, all common equilibrium concepts would deviate from these points because both players' payoffs can be increased with still equal profits or revenues.
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Notes: Wage and share classes are labeled by their upper limits. Wages are absolute numbers, shares are percentages. The maximum of each column is underlined. Frequencies above 5% are highlighted in gray. Total   10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100 700 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.00 1.67 650 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 600 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 550 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 500 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 450 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 400 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 350 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 300 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 250 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 200 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 À100 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.33 À150 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 À200 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 À250 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 3.33 À300 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.33 À350 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 À400 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 À450 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 À500 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 À550 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 À600 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 À650 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.67 Total 10.00 6.67 8.33 15.00 30.00 20.00 5.00 3.33 0.00 1.67 100.00
Notes: Wage and share classes are labeled by their upper limits. Wages are absolute numbers, shares are percentages. The maximum of each column (if positive) is underlined. Frequencies above 5% are highlighted in gray.
